Now cap & trade is REALLY dead

From the WaPo:

[Obama] also virtually abandoned his legislation – hopelessly stalled in the Senate – featuring economic incentives to reduce carbon emissions from power plants, vehicles and other sources.

“I’m going to be looking for other means of addressing this problem,” he said. “Cap and trade was just one way of skinning the cat,” he said, strongly implying there will be others.

In the campaign, Republicans slammed the bill as a “national energy tax” and jobs killer, and numerous Democrats sought to emphasize their opposition to the measure during their own re-election races.

Brookings reflects, Toles nails it.

There must be a model here somewhere

I ran across a nice interpretation of Paul Krugman’s comments on China’s monetary policy. It’s also a great example of the limitations of verbal descriptions of complex feedbacks:

In order to invest in China you need state permission and the state limits how much money comes in. It essentially has an import quota on Yuan.

This means that while Yuan are loose in the international market and therefore cheap, they are actually tight at home and therefore expensive. Because China is controlling the flow on money across the border it can have a loose international monetary policy but a tight domestic monetary policy.

Indeed, it goes deeper than that. A loose international Yuan bids up foreign demand for Chinese goods. This in turn both increase the quantity of goods China produces and their domestic price. Essentially, foreign consumers are given a price advantage relative to domestic consumers.

However, China doesn’t want domestic consumers to face higher prices. So, it has to tighten the domestic Yuan even tighter. It has too push down domestic demand so that the sum of international demand plus domestic demand are not so high that they produce domestic inflation.

The tight domestic Yuan, therefore, is driving down Chinese consumption at precisely the time in which the world could use more consumption. The loose international Yuan also gives foreigners a price advantage when buying Chinese goods and so it is driving down inflation in the US at precisely the time the Fed is trying to dive it up.

However, the story still gets worse from there – I am really riffing here, half of this is just occurring to me as I type. The loose international Yuan can only be used to produce manufactured goods. Manufacturing requires commodities both as the feed stock for the actual goods and to be used in the construction of new manufacturing facilities.

What does that mean. It should mean that when the Fed loosens policy, that China responds by loosening the International Yuan which in turn gets shunted towards commodities. Thus rather than boosting the consumer price level as we hope, Fed easing actually winds up boosting commodities.

This is because China is offsetting the total increase in worldwide consumer demand by tightening the Yuan at home, and boosting the total increase in commodity demand by loosening the Yuan abroad.

If this is a bit baffling, it helps to get the context from the originals. Still, it begs for a model or at least a diagram. At least the punch line is simple:

Thus this Yuan policy does all the wrong things.

Meanwhile, in a bizarre parallel universe where climate policy exists in a vacuum, China calls the US a preening pig. Couldn’t they at least wait for Palin to be elected? Seriously, US climate policy is a joke, but Chinese monetary-industrial policy is just as destructive.

Climate CoLab Contest

The Climate CoLab is an interesting experiment that combines three features,

  • Collaborative simulation modeling (including several integrated assessment models and C-LEARN)
  • On-line debates
  • Collective decision-making

Together these create an infrastructure for collective intelligence that gets beyond the unreal rhetoric that pervades many policy debates.

The CoLab is launching its 2010 round of policy proposal contests:

To members of the Climate CoLab community,

We are pleased to announce the launch of a new Climate CoLab contest, as well as a major upgrade of our software platform.

The contest will address the question: What international climate agreements should the world community make?

The first round runs through October 31 and the final round through November 26.

In early December, the United Nations and U.S. Congress will be briefed on the winning entries.

We are raising funds in the hope of being able to pay travel expenses for one representative from each winning team to attend one or both of these briefings.

We invite you to form teams and enter the contest–learn more at http://climatecolab.org.

We also encourage you to fill out your profiles and add a picture, so that members of the community can get to know each other.

And please inform anyone you believe might be interested about the contest.

Best,

Rob Laubacher

The contest leads to real briefings on the hill, and there are prizes for winners. See details.

Cap & trade is dead. Long live cap & trade?

Democrats have pulled the plug on a sweeping energy bill this year. There is no heir apparent. This is not cause for panic. In climate, as in education, there are no emergencies.

However, the underlying reasons may be cause for panic. It seems that voters are unwilling to accept any policy that will significantly raise the price of emissions. Given that price is a predominant information carrier in our economy, other polices are unlikely to work efficiently, absent a price signal. That leaves us in a bit of a pickle. What to do?

If you don’t want to buck public opinion, advise the people to invest in (then pray for) a technological miracle. Ask yourself, “Do I feel lucky?” It might even work.

Alternatively, you might conclude that the public hasn’t quite grasped the nature of the problem – that wait and see is not a good policy in systems with long delays. But then you’d be accused of scientism, for the equivalent of challenging the efficient market hypothesis or the notion that the customer is always right. That’s rather puzzling, given that there’s direct evidence that people don’t intuitively appreciate the dynamics of accumulation, and that snowstorms in the East cause half of Americans to question the reality of climate change.

The anti-scientism, pro-technology crowd takes opposition to meaningful mitigation policy as a sure sign that the public is on to something. The wisdom of crowds is powerful when there’s diverse information and rapid feedback, as in price discovery through a market. But it has a pretty disastrous history in the runup to bubbles and other catastrophes, as we’ve recently seen. Surely there are some legitimate worries about current climate proposals (I’ve expressed a number here), but it doesn’t follow that pricing emissions is a bad decision.

So, what’s a modeler to do? Opening up political debates is a good idea, though not quite in the way that I think proponents intend. We already have plenty of political debates. The problem is that they tend to lack ready access to scientific or other information that can be agreed upon or at least presented in a way that permits testing of hypotheses against data or evaluation of decisions against contingencies. That means that questions of values and distribution of benefits (which politics is rightfully about) get mixed up with muddled thinking about science, economics, and social system dynamics.

The solution typically proposed is to open up science and models to more public scrutiny. That’s a good idea for a variety of reasons, but by itself it’s a losing proposition for scientists- they get all the criticism, and the public process doesn’t assimilate much of their insights. What’s needed is a fair exchange, where everyone shows their hands. Scientists make their stuff accessible, and in return participants in policy debates actually use it, and additionally submit to formalization of their arguments to facilitate shared understanding and testing.

Coming back to cap & trade, I don’t see that the major political players are willing to do that. Following a successful round of multi-stakeholder workshops that brought a systems perspective to conversations about climate policy, funded by the petro industry in California, we spent a fair amount of time marketing the idea of a model-assisted deliberation process targeted at shared design of federal climate policy. Lobbyists at some of the big stakeholders told us very forthrightly that they were unwilling to engage in any process with an outcome that they couldn’t predict and control.

In an environment where everyone’s happy with their own entrenched position, their isn’t much hope for a good solution to emerge. The only solution I see is to make an end run around the big players, and go straight to the public with better information, in order to expand the set of things they’ll accept. I hope there’s time for that to work.

Policy Resistance – Immigration & Prohibition

Complex systems find many ways of resisting or evading pressures, resulting in policy failure, backlashes, whack-a-mole games and other unintended consequences. Some great examples just wandered by my desk:

Via Economist’s View:

Immigration reform has a long history of unintended consequences: More than two decades of increased enforcement since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 has done little to reduce the number of illegal immigrants. In fact, it seems to have increased their numbers. …

Princeton University sociologist Douglas Massey pointed out … that measures to secure the border seemed to produce almost the opposite of what was intended. … With increasing border enforcement, workers who used to shuttle between jobs in California or Texas and home in Zacatecas or Michoacán simply began to stay put and sent for their families, becoming permanent, if sometimes reluctant, residents. According to Massey, post-IRCA border enforcement may have increased the size of the permanent Mexican population in the United States by a factor of nearly four.

From a great article on Wayne Wheeler, The Man Who Turned Off the Taps, in Smithsonian:

But for all his political might, Wheeler could not do what he and all the other Prohibitionists had set out to do: they could not purge alcoholic beverages from American life. Drinking did decline at first, but a combination of legal loopholes, personal tastes and political expediency conspired against a dry regime.

As declarative as the 18th Amendment was—forbidding “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors”—the Volstead Act allowed exceptions. You were allowed to keep (and drink) liquor you had in your possession as of January 16, 1920; this enabled the Yale Club in New York, for instance, to stockpile a supply large enough to last the full 14 years that Prohibition was in force. Farmers and others were allowed to “preserve” their fruit through fermentation, which placed hard cider in cupboards across the countryside and homemade wine in urban basements. “Medicinal liquor” was still allowed, enriching physicians (who generally charged by the prescription) and pharmacists (who sold such “medicinal” brands as Old Grand-Dad and Johnnie Walker). A religious exception created a boom in sacramental wines, leading one California vintner to sell communion wine—legally—in 14 different varieties, including port, sherry, tokay and cabernet sauvignon.

By the mid-’20s, those with a taste for alcohol had no trouble finding it, especially in the cities of the East and West coasts and along the Canadian border. At one point the New York police commissioner estimated there were 32,000 illegal establishments selling liquor in his city. In Detroit, a newsman said, “It was absolutely impossible to get a drink…unless you walked at least ten feet and told the busy bartender what you wanted in a voice loud enough for him to hear you above the uproar.” Washington’s best-known bootlegger, George L. Cassiday (known to most people as “the man in the green hat”), insisted that “a majority of both houses” of Congress bought from him, and few thought he was bragging.

Worst of all, the nation’s vast thirst gave rise to a new phenomenon—organized crime, in the form of transnational syndicates that controlled everything from manufacture to pricing to distribution. A corrupt and underfunded Prohibition Bureau couldn’t begin to stop the spread of the syndicates, which considered the politicians who kept Prohibition in place their greatest allies. Not only did Prohibition create their market, it enhanced their profit margins: from all the billions of gallons of liquor that changed hands illegally during Prohibition, the bootleggers did not pay, nor did the government collect, a single penny of tax.

The prohibition article also poses an interesting puzzle. If prohibition was more or less quickly and broadly unpopular, how did it get passed by such landslide margins in the first place? I can’t believe that ignorance of the possible outcome was universal, so there must have been some powerful positive feedback behind the initial passage of the policy. Perhaps it was a tipping point effect: once a vote becomes sufficiently lopsided, fewer and fewer politicians want to be on the losing side of a landslide vote, so they join the herd. A modern analogy might be the post-9/11 authorization of the Iraq war.

The RGGI budget raid and cap & trade credibility

I haven’t been watching the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative very closely, but some questions from a colleague prompted me to do a little sniffing around. I happened to run across this item:

Warnings realized in RGGI budget raid

The Business and Industry Association of New Hampshire was not surprised that the Legislature on Wednesday took $3.1 million in Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative funds to help balance the state budget.

“We warned everybody two years ago that this is a big pot of money that is ripe for the plucking, and that’s exactly what happened,” said David Juvet, the organization’s vice president.

Indeed, the raid happened without any real debate at all. In fact, the only other RGGI-related proposal – backed by Republicans – was to take even more money from the fund.

… New York state lawmakers grabbed $90 million in RGGI funds last December. Shortly afterwards, New Jersey followed suit taking $65 million in the last budget year. And “the governor left the door wide open for next year. They are taking it all,” said Matt Elliott of Environment New Jersey. …

This is a problem because it confirms the talking point of “cap & tax” opponents, that emissions revenue streams will be commandeered for government largesse. There is a simple solution, I think, which is to redistribute the proceeds transparently, so that it’s obvious that a raid on revenues is a raid on pocketbooks. The BC carbon tax did that initially, though it’s apparently falling off the wagon.

The real Kerry-Lieberman APA stands up, with two big surprises

The official discussion draft of the Kerry-Lieberman American Power Act is out. My heart sank when I saw the page count – 987. I won’t be able to review this in any detail soon. Based on a quick look, I see two potentially huge items: the “hard price collar” has a soft ceiling, and transport fuels are in the market, despite claims to the contrary.

Hard is soft

First, the summary states that there’s a “hard price collar which binds carbon prices and creates a predictable system for carbon prices to rise at a fixed rate over inflation.” That’s not quite right. There is indeed a floor, set by an auction reserve price in Section 790. However, I can’t find a ceiling as such. Instead, Section 726 establishes a “Cost Containment Reserve” that is somewhat like the Waxman-Markey strategic reserve, without the roach motel moving average price (offsets check in, but they don’t check out). Instead, reserve allowances are available at the escalating ceiling price ($25 + 5%/yr). There’s a much larger initial reserve (4 gigatons) and I think a more generous topping off (1.5% of allowances each year initially; 5% after 2030). However, there appears to be no mechanism to provide allowances beyond the set-aside. That means that the economy-wide target is in fact binding. If demand eats up the reserve allowance buffer, prices will have to rise above the ceiling in order to clear the market. So, the market actually faces a hard target, with the reserve/ceiling mechanism merely creating a temporary respite from price spikes. The price ceiling is soft if allowance demand at the ceiling price is sufficient to exhaust the buffer. The mental model behind this design must be that estimated future emission prices are about right, so that one need only protect against short term volatility. However, if those estimates are systematically wrong, and the marginal cost of mitigation persistently exceeds the ceiling, the reserve provides no protection against price escalation.

Transport is in the market

The short transport summary asserts:

Since a robust domestic refining industry is critical to our national security, we needed to make a change. We took fuel providers out of the market. Instead of every refinery participating in the market for allowances, we made sure the price of carbon was constant across the industry. That means all fuel providers see the same price of carbon in a given quarter. The system is simple. First, the EPA and EIA Administrators look to historic product sales to estimate how many allowances will be necessary to cover emissions for the quarter, and they set that number of allowances aside at the market price. Then refineries and fuel providers sell fuel, competing as they have always done to offer the best product at the best price. Finally, at the end of the quarter, the refiners and fuel providers purchase the allowances that have been set aside for them. If there are too many or too few allowances set aside, that difference is made up by adjusting the projection for the following quarter. These allowances cannot be banked or traded, and can only be used for compliance purposes.

In fact, transport is in the market, just via a different mechanism. Instead of buying allowances realtime, with banking and borrowing, refiners are price takers and get allowances via a set-aside mechanism. Since there’s nothing about the mechanism that creates allowances, the market still has to clear. The mechanism simply introduces a one quarter delay into the market clearing process. I don’t see how this additional complication is any better for refiners. Introducing the delay into the negative feedback loops that clear the market could be destabilizing. This is so enticing, I’ll have to simulate it.

My analysis is a bit hasty here, so I could be wrong, but if I’m right these two issues have huge implications for the performance of the bill.

Oily balls

The device designed to cut the oil flow after BP’s oil rig exploded was faulty, the head of a congressional committee said on Wednesday … the rig’s underwater blowout preventer had a leak in its hydraulic system and the device was not powerful enough to cut through joints to seal the drill pipe. …

Markey joked about BP’s proposal to stuff the blowout preventer with golf balls, oil tires “and other junk” to block the spewing oil.

“When we heard the best minds were on the case, we expected MIT, not the PGA,” said Markey, referring to the professional golfing group. “We already have one hole in the ground and now their solution is to shoot a hole in one?”

Via Reuters

Complexity is not the enemy

Following its misguided attack on complex CLDs, a few of us wrote a letter to the NYTimes. Since they didn’t publish, here it is:

Dear Editors, Systemic Spaghetti Slide Snookers Scribe. Powerpoint Pleases Policy Players

“We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint” clearly struck a deep vein of resentment against mindless presentations. However, the lead “spaghetti” image, while undoubtedly too much to absorb quickly, is in fact packed with meaning for those who understand its visual lingo. If we can’t digest a mere slide depicting complexity, how can we successfully confront the underlying problem?

The diagram was not created in Powerpoint. It is a “causal loop diagram,” one of a several ways to describe relationships that influence the evolution of messy problems like the war in the Middle East. It’s a perfect illustration of General McMaster’s observation that, “Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable.” Diagrams like this may not be intended for public consumption; instead they serve as a map that facilitates communication within a group. Creating such diagrams allows groups to capture and improve their understanding of very complex systems by sharing their mental models and making them open to challenge and modification. Such diagrams, and the formal computer models that often support them, help groups to develop a more robust understanding of the dynamics of a problem and to develop effective and elegant solutions to vexing challenges.

It’s ironic that so many call for a return to pure verbal communication as an antidote for Powerpoint. We might get a few great speeches from that approach, but words are ill-suited to describe some data and systems. More likely, a return to unaided words would bring us a forgettable barrage of five-pagers filled with laundry-list thinking and unidirectional causality.

The excess supply of bad presentations does not exist in a vacuum. If we want better presentations, then we should determine why organizational pressures demand meaningless propaganda, rather than blaming our tools.

Tom Fiddaman of Ventana Systems, Inc. & Dave Packer, Kristina Wile, and Rebecca Niles Peretz of The Systems Thinking Collaborative

Other responses of note:

We have met an ally and he is Storytelling (Chris Soderquist)

Why We Should be Suspect of Bullet Points and Laundry Lists (Linda Booth Sweeney)