Data science meets the bottom line

A view from simulation & System Dynamics


I come to data science from simulation and System Dynamics, which originated in control engineering, rather than from the statistics and database world. For much of my career, I’ve been working on problems in strategy and public policy, where we have some access to mental models and other a priori information, but little formal data. The attribution of success is tough, due to the ambiguity, long time horizons and diverse stakeholders.

I’ve always looked over the fence into the big data pasture with a bit of envy, because it seemed that most projects were more tactical, and establishing value based on immediate operational improvements would be fairly simple. So, I was surprised to see data scientists’ angst over establishing business value for their work:

One part of solving the business value problem comes naturally when you approach things from the engineering point of view. It’s second nature to include an objective function in our models, whether it’s the cash flow NPV for a firm, a project’s duration, or delta-V for a rocket. When you start with an abstract statistical model, you have to be a little more deliberate about representing the goal after the model is estimated (a simulation model may be the delivery vehicle that’s needed).

You can solve a problem whether you start with the model or start with the data, but I think your preferred approach does shape your world view. Here’s my vision of the simulation-centric universe:

The more your aspirations cross organizational silos, the more you need the engineering mindset, because you’ll have data gaps at the boundaries – variations in source, frequency, aggregation and interpretation. You can backfill those gaps with structural knowledge, so that the model-data combination yields good indirect measurements of system state. A machine learning algorithm doesn’t know about dimensional consistency, conservation of people, or accounting identities unless the data reveals such structure, but you probably do. On the other hand, when your problem is local, data is plentiful and your prior knowledge is weak, an algorithm can explore more possibilities than you can dream up in a given amount of time. (Combining the two approaches, by using prior knowledge of structure as “free data” constraints for automated model construction, is an area of active research here at Ventana.)

I think all approaches have a lot in common. We’re all trying to improve performance with systems science, we all have to deal with messy data that’s expensive to process, and we all face challenges formulating problems and staying connected to decision makers. Simulations need better connectivity to data and users, and purely data driven approaches aren’t going to solve our biggest problems without some strategic context, so maybe the big data and simulation worlds should be working with each other more.

Cross-posted from LinkedIn

Why so many incompetent leaders, period?

The HBR has a nice article asking, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders? Gender may amplify the problem, but I think its roots lie much deeper. We have a general surplus of incompetence across all walks of life.

So, how does this unhappy situation persist? One would hope that evolution would take care of this – that companies or nations that were systematically fooled by confidence over substance would be naturally selected out of the population. But that doesn’t seem to happen.

I think the explanation lies in the weaknesses of our mental models (and failure to refine them with formal models), and therefore our inability to attribute success and failure to decisions, in hindsight or prospects.

The HBR has a nice article asking, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders? Some excerpts:

In my view, the main reason for the uneven management sex ratio is our inability to discern between confidence and competence. That is, because we (people in general) commonly misinterpret displays of confidence as a sign of competence, we are fooled into believing that men are better leaders than women. In other words, when it comes to leadership, the only advantage that men have over women … is the fact that manifestations of hubris — often masked as charisma or charm — are commonly mistaken for leadership potential, and that these occur much more frequently in men than in women.

The truth of the matter is that pretty much anywhere in the world men tend to think that they that are much smarter than women. Yet arrogance and overconfidence are inversely related to leadership talent — the ability to build and maintain high-performing teams, and to inspire followers to set aside their selfish agendas in order to work for the common interest of the group.

The paradoxical implication is that the same psychological characteristics that enable male managers to rise to the top of the corporate or political ladder are actually responsible for their downfall. In other words, what it takes to get the job is not just different from, but also the reverse of, what it takes to do the job well. …

In fact, most leaders — whether in politics or business — fail. That has always been the case: the majority of nations, companies, societies and organizations are poorly managed, as indicated by their longevity, revenues, and approval ratings, or by the effects they have on their citizens, employees, subordinates or members. Good leadership has always been the exception, not the norm.

Gender may amplify the problem, but I think its roots lie much deeper. We have a general surplus of incompetence across all walks of life.

So, how does this unhappy situation persist? One would hope that evolution would take care of this – that companies or nations that were systematically fooled by confidence over substance would be naturally selected out of the population. But that doesn’t seem to happen.

I think the explanation lies in the weaknesses of our mental models (and failure to refine them with formal models), and therefore our inability to attribute success and failure to decisions, in hindsight or prospects.  Here’s the purest expression of this line of thinking I’ve seen:

Why I Switched My Endorsement from Clinton to Trump

1. Things I Don’t Know: There are many things I don’t know. For example, I don’t know the best way to defeat ISIS. Neither do you. I don’t know the best way to negotiate trade policies. Neither do you. I don’t know the best tax policy to lift all boats. Neither do you. …. So on most political topics, I don’t know enough to make a decision. Neither do you, but you probably think you do.

3. Party or Wake: It seems to me that Trump supporters are planning for the world’s biggest party on election night whereas Clinton supporters seem to be preparing for a funeral. I want to be invited to the event that doesn’t involve crying and moving to Canada. (This issue isn’t my biggest reason.)

Scott Adams, Dilbert creator

If you can’t predict which leader’s proposals or methods will work, why not go with the ones that sound the best? Or, if you can’t figure out how to grow the pie for everyone, why not at least choose the tribal affiliation that gives you the best chance at a slice of patrimony?

Still, at the end of the day, the honeymoon is over, and the effects of decisions should come home to roost, right? Not necessarily. Even after the fact, attribution of causality in dynamic systems is difficult, because causes and effects are separated in space in time. So, you can’t learn to do better by simple pattern matching; you have to understand the structure that’s producing behavior. Firm policies and election rules worsen the problem by rotating people around, so that they can launch initiatives and be gone before the consequences are observed, defeating evolution.

John Sterman and Nelson Repenning explain in another context:

The Capability Trap
The capability trap arises from the interactions between judg-
mental biases and the physical structure of work processes.
For example, machine operators or design engineers facing a
shortfall may initially work harder …, do more rework
…, or focus on throughput …, all of which
reduce the time available for improvement. These responses
are tempting because they yield immediate gains, while their
costs are distant in time and space, uncertain, and hard to
detect. But, while throughput improves in the short run, the
reduction in time dedicated to learning causes process capa-
bility to decline. Eventually, workers find themselves again
falling short of their throughput target, forcing a further shift
toward working and away from improving. Instead of making
up for the improvement activity they skipped earlier, their
own past actions, by causing the reinvestment loops … to work as vicious cycles, trap them in a downward
spiral of eroding process capability, increasing work hours,
and less and less time for improvement.

Misperceptions of Feedback
While the literature and field data support the links in the
model, our account of the capability trap raises several
questions. First, wouldn’t people recognize the existence of
the reinforcing feedbacks that create the trap and take
actions to avoid it? Second, if they find themselves stuck in
the trap, wouldn’t people learn to escape it by making appro-
priate short-term sacrifices? Studies of decision making in
dynamic environments suggest that such learning is far from
automatic.
Consider the outcome feedback received from a decision to
spend more time working and less on improvement. Perfor-
mance quickly increases, producing a clear, salient, unam-
biguous outcome. In contrast, the negative consequences of
this action—the decline in process capability—take time, are
hard to observe, and may have ambiguous interpretations. In
experiments ranging from running a simulated production and
distribution system (Sterman, 1989) to fighting a simulated
forest fire (Brehmer, 1992) or managing a simulated fishery
(Moxnes, 1999), subjects have been shown to grossly over-
weight the short-run positive benefits of their decisions while
ignoring the long-run, negative consequences. Participants in
these experiments produce wildly oscillating production
rates, allow their fire-fighting headquarters to burn down, and
find their fleets idled after overexploiting their fisheries.
….

Once caught in the capability trap, people are also unlikely to
learn to escape it. A new improvement program, by reducing
the time available for throughput, causes an immediate and
salient drop in performance, while its benefits are uncertain,
delayed, difficult to assess, and may be insufficient to switch
the reinforcing feedbacks to virtuous cycles. People are likely
to conclude that the improvement program they attempted
does not work and should be abandoned.

Attribution Errors in Judging the Cause of Low Throughput
When choosing to emphasize first- or second-order improve-
ment, managers must make a judgment about the causes of
low process throughput. If they believe the cause of low per-
formance lies in the physical structure of the process, they
are likely to focus their efforts on process improvement. If,
however, low throughput is thought to result from lack of
worker effort or discipline, then managers are better off

focusing on increasing the quantity of work. The cues people

use to make causal attributions include temporal order,
covariation, and contiguity in time and space (Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1986). Attributing low throughput to inadequate
worker effort is consistent with all these cues: …. Managers are thus likely to attribute a throughput shortfall to inadequate worker effort, even when the true causes are systemic process
problems.
Managers’ tendency to attribute performance shortfalls to
problems with the workforce rather than the production sys-
tem is reinforced by the so-called fundamental attribution
error, or dispositional bias. …. Existing research thus suggests that managers facing throughput gaps are likely to conclude that workers, not the process, are the cause of low throughput, reinforcing the bias against fundamental improvement.
As Sterman & Repenning go on to explain, these attribution errors are likely to become self-confirming, and to be institutionalized in organizational routines, leading to self-reinforcing organizational pathologies.
Blaming workers for productivity shortfalls that ultimately arise from the firm leadership’s failure to focus on process improvement is a lot like blaming poverty on the shortcomings of poor people, rather than their social environment, which subjects them to poor education, predatory monopolies and disproportionate criminal and environmental burdens. Programs that focus exclusively on motivating (or punishing) the impoverished are at least as naive as those that seek to alleviate poverty through transfers of money without creating skills or opportunities.
Back to Scott Adams, one argument in favor of unfounded overconfidence remains:

6. Persuasion: Economies are driven by psychology. If you expect things to go well tomorrow, you invest today, which causes things to go well tomorrow, as long as others are doing the same. The best kind of president for managing the psychology of citizens – and therefore the economy – is a trained persuader. You can call that persuader a con man, a snake oil salesman, a carnival barker, or full of shit. It’s all persuasion. And Trump simply does it better than I have ever seen anyone do it.

Most of the job of president is persuasion. Presidents don’t need to understand policy minutia. They need to listen to experts and then help sell the best expert solutions to the public. Trump sells better than anyone you have ever seen, even if you haven’t personally bought into him yet. You can’t deny his persuasion talents that have gotten him this far.

Psychology is in steady state over any reasonably long time horizon, so it’s not really psychology that drives economic growth. Psychology is necessary, in that people have to feel that conditions are right for risk-taking, but it’s not sufficient. The real long run driver is innovation, embodied in people, technology and organizations. That means it’s also necessary that innovations work, so investments produce, GDP makes people happy, schools teach, infrastructure serves, and wars defeat more enemies than they create. Mere bluster does not get you those things.
So here’s the problem: the overconfidence that lends itself to persuasion has side effects:
  • It’s hostile to “listening to experts” (or to anyone).
  • It favors naive, simple causal attributions over inquiry into system structure.
  • It opposes learning from feedback, whether from constituents or objective measurements.
  • Confronted by adversity, it retreats into confirmation bias and threat rigidity.

So, overconfidence doesn’t make the economy grow faster. It just makes things go faster, whether paradise or a cliff lies ahead.

I don’t think firms or planets want to speed off a cliff, so we need to do better. It’s a tall order, but I think awareness of the problem is a good start. After that, it’s a hard road, but we all need to become better system scientists, and spend more time participating in governance and attempting to understand how systems work.

There’s reason for hope – not all firms fall into capability traps. Emulating those that succeed, we might start by investing some time in process improvement. The flawed processes by which we now pick leaders look like low-hanging fruit to me.

Job tenure dynamics

This is a simple model of the dynamics of employment in a sector. I built it for a LinkedIn article that describes the situation and the data.

The model is interesting and reasonably robust, but it has (at least) three issues you should know about:

  • The initialization in equilibrium isn’t quite perfect.
  • The sector-entry decision (Net Entering) is not robust to low unemployment. In some situations, a negative net entering flow could cause negative Job Seekers.
  • The sector-entry decision also formulates attractiveness exclusively as a function of salaries; in fact, it should also account for job availability (perceived vacancy and unemployment rates).

Correcting these shortcomings shouldn’t be too hard, and it should make the model’s oscillatory tendencies more realistic. I leave this as an exercise for you. Drop me a note if you have an improved version.

The model requires Vensim (any version, including free PLE).

Download employees1.mdl

Snow is Normal in Montana

In this case, I think it’s quite literally Normal a.k.a. Gaussian:

Normally distributed snow

Here’s what I think is happening. On windless days with powder, the snow dribbles off the edge of the roof (just above the center of the hump). Flakes drift down in a random walk. The railing terminates the walk after about four feet, by which time the distribution of flake positions has already reached the Normal you’d expect from the Central Limit Theorem.

Enough of the geek stuff; I think I’ll go ski the field.

Forrester on Continuous Flows

I just published three short videos with sample models, illustrating representation of discrete and random events in Vensim.

Jay Forrester‘s advice from Industrial Dynamics is still highly relevant. Here’s an excerpt:

Chapter 5, Principles for Formulating Models

5.5 Continuous Flows

In formulating a model of an industrial operation, we suggest that the system be treated, at least initially, on the basis of continuous flows and interactions of the variables. Discreteness of events is entirely compatible with the concept of information-feedback systems, but we must be on guard against unnecessarily cluttering our formulation with the detail of discrete events that only obscure the momentum and continuity exhibited by our industrial systems.

In beginning, decisions should be formulated in the model as if they were continuously (but not implying instantaneously) responsive to the factors on which they are based. This means that decisions will not be formulated for intermittent reconsideration each week, month or year. For example, factory production capacity would vary continuously, not by discrete additions. Ordering would go on continuously, not monthly when the stock records are reviewed.

There are several reasons for recommending the initial formulation of a continuous model:

  • Real systems are more nearly continuous than is commonly supposed …
  • There will usually be considerable “aggregation” …
  • A continuous-flow system is usually an effective first approximation …
  • There is a natural tendency of model builders and executives to overstress the discontinuities of real situations. …
  • A continuous-flow model helps to concentrate attention on the central framework of the system. …
  • As a starting point, the dynamics of the continuous-flow model are usually easier to understand …
  • A discontinuous model, which is evaluated at infrequent intervals, such as an economic model solved for a new set of values annually, should never be justified by the fact that data in the real system have been collected at such infrequent intervals. …

These comments should never be construed as suggesting that the model builder should lack interest in the microscopic separate events that occur in a continuous-flow channel. The course of the continuous flow is the course of the separate events in it. By studying individual events we get a picture of how decisions are made and how the flows are delayed. The study of individual events is on of our richest sources of information about the way the flow channels of the model should be constructed. When a decision is actually being made regularly on a periodic basis, like once a month, the continuous-flow equivalent channel should contain a delay of half the interval; this represents the average delay encountered by information in the channel.

The preceding comments do not imply that discreteness is difficult to represent, nor that it should forever be excluded from a model. At times it will become significant. For example, it may create a disturbance that will cause system fluctuations that can be mistakenly interreted as externally generated cycles (…). When a model has progressed to the point where such refinements are justified, and there is reason to believe that discreteness has a significant influence on system behavior, discontinuous variables should then be explored to determine their effect on the model.

[Ellipses added – see the original for elaboration.]

A conversation about infrastructure

A conversation about infrastructure, with Carter Williams of iSelect and me:

The $3 Trillion Problem: Solving America’s Infrastructure Crisis

I can’t believe I forgot to mention one of the most obvious System Dynamics insights about infrastructure:

There are two ways to fill a leaky bucket – increase the inflow, or plug the outflows. There’s always lots of enthusiasm for increasing the inflow by building new stuff. But there’s little sense in adding to the infrastructure stock if you can’t maintain what you have. So, plug the leaks first, and get into a proactive maintenance mode. Then you can have fun building new things – if you can afford it.

Rats leaving a sinking Sears

Sears Roebuck & Co. was a big part of my extended family at one time. My wife’s grandfather started in the mail room and worked his way up to executive, through the introduction of computers and the firebombing in Caracas. Sadly, its demise appears imminent.

Business Insider has an interesting article on the dynamics of Sears’ decline. Here’s a quick causal loop diagram summarizing some of the many positive feedbacks that once drove growth, but now are vicious cycles:

sears_rats_sinking_ships_corr

h/t @johnrodat

CLD corrected, 1/9/17.

Privatizing Public Lands – Claim your 0.3 acres now!

BLM Public Lands Statistics show that the federal government holds about 643 million acres – about 2 acres for each person.

But what would you really get if these lands were transferred to the states and privatized by sale? Asset sales would distribute land roughly according to the existing distribution of wealth. Here’s how that would look:

The Forbes 400 has a net worth of $2.4 trillion, not quite 3% of US household net worth. If you’re one of those lucky few, your cut would be about 44,000 acres, or 69 square miles.

Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffet, Mark Zuckerberg and Larry Ellison alone could split Yellowstone National Park (over 2 million acres).

The top 1% wealthiest Americans (35% of net worth) would average 70 acres each, and the next 19% (51% of net worth) would get a little over 5 acres.

The other 80% of America would split the remaining 14% of the land. That’s about a third of an acre each, which would be a good-sized suburban lot, if it weren’t in the middle of Nevada or Alaska.

You can’t even see the average person’s share on a graph, unless you use a logarithmic scale:

landpercaplog

Otherwise, the result just looks ridiculous, even if you ignore the outliers:

landpercap