ICE Roadkill

Several countries have now announced eventual bans of internal combustion engines. It’s nice that such a thing can now be contemplated, but this strikes me as a fundamentally flawed approach.

Banning a whole technology class outright is inefficient. When push comes to shove, that inefficiency is likely to lead to an implementation that’s complex and laden with exceptions. Bans and standards are better than nothing, but that regulatory complexity gives opponents something real to whine about. Then the loonies come out. At any plausible corporate cost of capital, a ban in 2040 has near-zero economic weight today.

Rather than banning gas and diesel vehicles at some abstract date in the far future, we should be pricing their externalities now. Air and water pollution, noise, resource extraction, the opportunity cost of space for roads and parking, and a dozen other free rides are good candidates. And, electric vehicles should not be immune to the same charges where applicable.

Once the basic price signal points the transportation market in the right direction, we can see what happens, and tinker around the edges with standards that address particular misperceptions and market failures.

A tale of Big Data and System Dynamics

I recently worked on a fascinating project that combined Big Data and System Dynamics (SD) to good effect. Neither method could have stood on its own, but the outcome really emphasized some of the strategic limitations of the data-driven approach. Including SD in the project simultaneously lowered the total cost of analysis, by avoiding data processing for things that could be determined a priori, and increased its value by connecting the data to business context.

I can’t give a direct account of what we did, because it’s proprietary, but here’s my best shot at the generalizable insights. The context was health care for some conditions that particularly affect low income and indigent populations. The patients are hard to track and hard to influence.

Two efforts worked in parallel: Big Data (led by another vendor) and System Dynamics (led by Ventana). I use the term “SD” loosely, because much of what we ultimately did was data-centric: agent based modeling and estimation of individual-level nonlinear dynamic models in Vensim. The Big Data vendor’s budget was two orders of magnitude greater than ours, mostly due to some expensive system integration tasks, but partly due to the caché of their brand and flashy approach, I suspect.

Predict Patient Events

Big Data idea #1 was to use machine learning methods to predict imminent expensive events, so that patients could be treated preemptively, saving the cost of ER visits and other expensive procedures. This involved statistical analysis of extremely detailed individual patient histories. In parallel, we modeled the delivery system and aggregate patient trajectories through many different system states. (Google’s Verily is pursuing something similar.)

Ultimately, the Big Data approach didn’t pan out. I think the cause was largely data limitations. Patient records have severe quality issues, including (we hypothesized) unobserved feedback from providers gaming the system to work around health coverage limitations. More importantly, it’s still  problematic to correlate well-observed aspects of patient care with other important states of the patient, like employment and social network support.

Some of the problems were not evident until we began looking at things from a stock-flow perspective. For example, it turned out that admission and release records were not conserving people. Test statistics on the data might have revealed this, but no one even thought to look until we created an operational description of the system and started trying to balance units and apply conservation laws. Machine learning algorithms were perfectly happy to consume the data uncritically.

Describing the system operationally in an SD model revealed a number of constraints that would have made implementation of the predictive approach difficult, even if data and algorithm constraints were eliminated. We also found that some of the insights from the Big Data approach were available from first principles in simple, aggregate “thinkpiece” models at a tiny fraction of the cost.

Things weren’t entirely rosy for the simulations, however. Building structural models is pretty quick, but calibrating them and testing alternative formulations is a slow process. Switching function calls to try a different machine learning algorithm is much easier. We really need hybrids that combine the best of both approaches.

An amusing aside: after data problems began to turn up, we found that we needed to understand more about patient histories. We made a movie that depicted a couple of years of events for tens of thousands of patients. It ran for almost an hour, with nothing but strips of colored dots. It has to be one of the most boring productions in the history of cinema, and yet it was absolutely riveting for anyone who understood the problem.

Segment Patient Populations & Buy Provider Risk

Big Data idea #2 was to abandon individual prediction and focus on population methods. The hope was to earn premium prices by improving on prevention in general, using that advantage to essentially sell reinsurance to providers through a patient performance contract.

The big data aspect involved a pharma marketing science favorite: segmentation. Cluster analysis and practical rules were used to identify “interesting” subpopulations of patients.

In parallel, we began to build agent and aggregate models of patient state trajectories, so see how the contract would actually work. Alarmingly, we discovered that the business rules of the proposal were not written down or fully specified anywhere. We made them up, but in the process discovered that there were many idiosyncratic cases that would need to be handled, like what to do with escrowed funds from patients whose performance history was incomplete at the time they churned out of a provider.

When we started to plug real numbers into the aggregate model, we immediately ran into a puzzle. We sampled costs from the (very large) full dataset, but we couldn’t replicate the relative costs of patients on and off the prevention protocol. After much digging, it turned out that there were two problems.

First, the distribution of patient costs is heavy-tailed (a power law). So, if clustering rules shift even a few high cost patients (out of millions) from one business category to another, the average cost can change significantly. Median costs are more stable, but the business doesn’t pay the median (this is essentially dictated by conservation of money).

Second, it turns out that clustering patients with short records is problematic, because it introduces selection and truncation biases into the determination of who’s at risk. The only valid fallback is to use each patient as its own control, using an errors in variables model. Once we refined the estimation techniques, we found that the short term savings from prevention didn’t pencil out very well when combined with the reinsurance business rules. (Fortunately, that’s not a general insight – we have another project underway that focuses on bigger advantages from prevention in the long run.)

Both of these issues should have been revealed by statistical red flags, poor confidence bounds, or failure to cross-validate. But for whatever, reason, that didn’t happen until we put the estimates into practice. Fortunately, that happened in our simulation model, not an expensive real trial.

Insights

Looking back at this adventure, I think we learned some important things:

  • There are no hard lines – we did SD with tens of thousands of agents, aggregate models, discrete event simulations, large statistical estimates by brute force simulation, and the Big Data approach did a lot of simple aggregation.
  • Detailed and aggregate approaches are complementary.
    • Big Data measurements contribute to SD or detailed simulations;
    • SD modeling vettes Big Data results in multiple ways.
  • Statistical approaches need business context, in-place validation, and synthetic data from simulations.
  • Anything you can do a priori, without data collection and processing, is an order of magnitude cheaper.
  • Simulation lets you rule out a lot of things that don’t matter and design experiments to focus on data that does matter, before you spend a ton of money.
  • SD raises questions you didn’t know to ask.
  • Hybrid approaches that embed machine learning algorithms in the decisions in SD models, or automate cross-validated calibration with structural experiments on SD models, would be very powerful.

Interestingly, the most enduring and interesting models, out of a dozen or so built over the course of the project, were some low-order SD models of patient life histories and adherence behavior. I hope to cover those in future posts.

AI is killing us now

I’ve been watching the debate over AI with some amusement, as if it were some other planet at risk. The Musk-Zuckerberg kerfuffle is the latest installment. Ars Technica thinks they’re both wrong:

At this point, these debates are largely semantic.

I don’t see how anyone could live through the last few years and fail to notice that networking and automation have enabled an explosion of fake news, filter bubbles and other information pathologies. These are absolutely policy relevant, and smarter AI is poised to deliver more of what we need least. The problem is here now, not from some impending future singularity.

Ars gets one point sort of right:

Plus, computer scientists have demonstrated repeatedly that AI is no better than its datasets, and the datasets that humans produce are full of errors and biases. Whatever AI we produce will be as flawed and confused as humans are.

I don’t think the data is really the problem; it’s the assumptions the data’s treated with and the context in which that occurs that’s really problematic. In any case, automating flawed aspects of ourselves is not benign!

Here’s what I think is going on:

AI, and more generally computing and networks are doing some good things. More data and computing power accelerate the discovery of truth. But truth is still elusive and expensive. On the other hand, AI is making bullsh!t really cheap (pardon the technical jargon). There are many mechanisms by which this occurs:

These amplifiers of disinformation serve increasingly concentrated wealth and power elites that are isolated from their negative consequences, and benefit from fueling the process. We wind up wallowing in a sea of information pollution (the deadliest among the sins of managing complex systems).

As BS becomes more prevalent, various reinforcing mechanisms start kicking in. Accepted falsehoods erode critical thinking abilities, and promote the rejection of ideas like empiricism that were the foundation of the Enlightenment. The proliferation of BS requires more debunking, taking time away from discovery. A general erosion of trust makes it harder to solve problems, opening the door for opportunistic rent-seeking non-solutions.

I think it’s a matter of survival for us to do better at critical thinking, so we can shift the balance between truth and BS. That might be one area where AI could safely assist. We have other assets as well, like the explosion of online learning opportunities. But I think we also need some cultural solutions, like better management of trust and anonymity, brakes on concentration, sanctions for lying, rewards for prediction, and more time for reflection.

The survival value of wrong beliefs

NPR has an alarming piece on school science.

She tells her students — like Nick Gurol, whose middle-schoolers believe the Earth is flat — that, as hard as they try, science teachers aren’t likely to change a student’s misconceptions just by correcting them. Gurol says his students got the idea of a flat planet from basketball star Kyrie Irving, who said as much on a podcast.

“And immediately I start to panic. How have I failed these kids so badly they think the Earth is flat just because a basketball player says it?” He says he tried reasoning with the students and showed them a video. Nothing worked.

“They think that I’m part of this larger conspiracy of being a round-Earther. That’s definitely hard for me because it feels like science isn’t real to them.”

For cases like this, Yoon suggests teachers give students the tools to think like a scientist. Teach them to gather evidence, check sources, deduce, hypothesize and synthesize results. Hopefully, then, they will come to the truth on their own.

This called to mind a post from way back, in which I considered reasons for the survival of antiscientific views.

It’s basically a matter of evolution. When crazy ideas negatively affect survival, they die out. But evolutionary forces are vastly diminished under some conditions, or even point the wrong way:

  1. Non-experimental science (reliance on observations of natural experiments; no controls or randomized assignment)
  2. Infrequent replication (few examples within the experience of an individual or community)
  3. High noise (more specifically, low signal-to-noise ratio)
  4. Complexity (nonlinearity, integrations or long delays between cause and effect, multiple agents, emergent phenomena)
  5. “Unsalience” (you can’t touch, taste, see, hear, or smell the variables in question)
  6. Cost (there’s some social or economic penalty  imposed by the policy implications of the theory)
  7. Commons (the risk of being wrong accrues to society more than the individual)

These are, incidentally, some of the same circumstances that make medical trials difficult, such that most papers are false.

Consider the flat earth idea. What cost accrues to students who hold this belief? None whatsoever, I think. A flat earth model will make terrible predictions of all kinds of things, but students are not making or relying on such predictions. The roundness of the earth is obviously not salient. So really, the only survival value that matters to students is the benefit of tribal allegiance.

If there are intertemporal dynamics, the situation is even worse. For any resource or capability investment problem, there’s worse before better behavior. Recovering depleted fish stocks requires diminished effort, and less to eat, in the near term. If a correct belief implies good long run stock management, adherents of the incorrect belief will have an advantage in the short run. You can’t count on selection weeding out the “dumb tribes” for planetary-scale problems, because we’re all in one.

This seems like a pretty intractable problem. If there’s a way out, it has to be cultural. If there were a bit more recognition of the value on making correct predictions, the halo of that would spill over to diminish the attractiveness of silly theories. That’s a case that ought to be compelling for basketball fans. Who wants to play on a team that can’t predict what the opponents will do, or how the ball will bounce?

System 3 thinking

There was lots of talk of dual process theory at the 2017 System Dynamics Conference. Nelson Repenning discussed it in his plenary presentation. The Donella Meadows Award paper investigated the effects on stock-flow task performance of priming subjects to think in System 2:

The dual-process theory and understanding of stocks and flows

Arash Baghaei Lakeh and Navid Ghaffarzadegan

Recent evidence suggests that using the analytic mode of thinking (System 2) can improve people’s performance in stock–flow (SF) tasks. In this paper, we further investigate the effects by implementing several different interventions in two studies. First, we replicate a previous finding that answering analytical questions before the SF task approximately doubles the likelihood of answering the stock questions correctly. We also investigate effects of three other interventions that can potentially prime participants to use their System 2. Specifically, the first group is asked to justify their response to the SF task; the second group is warned about the difficulty of the SF task; and the third group is offered information about cognitive biases and the role of the analytic mode of thinking. We find that the second group showed a statistically significant improvement in their performance. We claim that there are simple interventions that can modestly improve people’s response in SF tasks.

Dual process refers to the idea that there are two systems of thinking at work in our minds. System 1 is fast, automatic intuition. System 2 is slow, rational reasoning.

I’ve lost track of the conversation, but some wag at the conference (not me; possibly Arash)  coined the term “System 3” for model-assisted thinking.

In a sense, any reasoning is “model-assisted,” but I think there’s an important distinction between purely mental reasoning and reasoning with a formal (usually computerized) modeling method like a dynamic simulation or even a spreadsheet.

When we reason in our heads, we have to simultaneously (A) describe the structure of the problem, (B) predict the behavior implied by the structure, and (C) test the structure against available information. Mentally, we’re pretty good at A, but pretty bad at B and C. No one can reliably simulate even a low-order dynamic system in their head, and there are too many model checks against data and thought experiments (like extreme conditions) to “run” without help.

System 3’s great weakness is that it takes still more time than using System 2. But it makes up for that in three ways. First, reliable predictions and tests of behavior reveal misconceptions about the problem/system structure that are otherwise inaccessible, so the result is higher quality. Second, the model is shareable, so it’s easier to convey insights to other stakeholders who need to be involved in a solution. Third, formal models can be reused, which lowers the effective cost of an application.

But how do you manage that “still more time” problem? Consider this advice:

I discovered a simple solution to making challenging choices more efficiently at an offsite last week with the CEO and senior leadership team of a high tech company. They were facing a number of unique, one-off decisions, the outcomes of which couldn’t be accurately predicted.

These are precisely the kinds of decisions which can linger for weeks, months, or even years, stalling the progress of entire organizations. …

But what if we could use the fact that there is no clear answer to make a faster decision?

“It’s 3:15pm,” He [the CEO] said. “We need to make a decision in the next 15 minutes.”

“Hold on,” the CFO responded, “this is a complex decision. Maybe we should continue the conversation at dinner, or at the next offsite.”

“No,” The CEO was resolute, “We will make a decision within the next 15 minutes.”

And you know what? We did.

Which is how I came to my third decision-making method: use a timer.

I’m in favor of using a timer to put a stop to dithering. Certainly a body with scarce time should move on when it perceives that it can’t add value. But this strikes me as a potentially costly reversion to System 1.

If a problem is strategic enough to make it to the board, but the board sees a landscape that prevents a clear decision, it ought to be straightforward to articulate why. Are there tradeoffs that make the payoff surface flat? The timer is a sensible response to that, because the decision doesn’t require precision. Are there competing feedback loops that suggest different leverage points, for which no one can agree about the gain? In that case, the consequence of an error could be severe, so the default answer should include a strategy for detection and correction. One ought to have a way to discriminate between these two situations, and a simple application of System 3 might be just the tool.

 

The intuitive mind is a gag gift

I saw Einstein quoted yesterday, “The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten the gift.”

I wondered what he meant, because I think of the intuitive mind as a treacherous friend. We can’t do without it, because we have too many decisions to make. You’d never get out of bed if everything had to be evaluated rationally. But at the same time, whatever heuristics are going on in there are the same ones that,

… and indulge in dozens of other biases. I think they’re also why Lightroom’s face recognition mixes me up with my dog.

How could Einstein revere intuition above reason? Perhaps he relished the intuitive guess at an equation, or some kind of Occam’s Razor argument about simplicity and beauty?

Well, it appears that the answer is simple, but not too simple. He didn’t say it.

Data Science should be about more than data

There are lots of “top 10 skills” lists for data science and analytics. The ones I’ve seen are all missing something huge.

Here’s an example:

Business Broadway – Top 10 Skills in Data Science

Modeling barely appears here. Almost all the items concern the collection and analysis of data (no surprise there). Just imagine for a moment what it would be like if science consisted purely of observation, with no theorizing.

What are you doing with all those data points and the algorithms that sift through them? At some point, you have to understand whether the relationships that emerge from your data make any sense and answer relevant questions. For that, you need ways of thinking and talking about the structure of the phenomena you’re looking at and the problems you’re trying to solve.

I’d argue that one’s literacy in data science is greatly enhanced by knowledge of mathematical modeling and simulation. That could be system dynamics, control theory, physics, economics, discrete event simulation, agent based modeling, or something similar. The exact discipline probably doesn’t matter, so long as you learn to formalize operational thinking about a problem, and pick up some good habits (like balancing units) along the way.

The Ambiguity of Causal Loop Diagrams and Archetypes

I find causal loop diagramming to be a very useful brainstorming and presentation tool, but it falls short of what a model can do for you.

Here’s why. Consider the following pair of archetypes (Eroding Goals and Escalation, from wikipedia):

Eroding Goals and Escalation archetypes

Archetypes are generic causal loop diagram (CLD) templates, with a particular behavior story. The Escalation and Eroding Goals archetypes have identical feedback loop structures, but very different stories. So, there’s no unique mapping from feedback loops to behavior. In order to predict what a set of loops is going to do, you need more information.

Here’s an implementation of Eroding Goals:

Notice several things:

  • I had to specify where the stocks and flows are.
  • “Actions to Improve Goals” and “Pressure to Adjust Conditions” aren’t well defined (I made them proportional to “Gap”).
  • Gap is not a very good variable name.
  • The real world may have structure that’s not mentioned in the archetype (indicated in red).

Here’s Escalation:

The loop structure is mathematically identical; only the parameterization is different. Again, the missing information turns out to be crucial. For example, if A and B start with the same results, there is no escalation – A and B results remain constant. To get escalation, you either need (1) A and B to start in different states, or (2) some kind of drift or self-excitation in decision making (green arrow above).

Even then, you may get different results. (2) gives exponential growth, which is the standard story for escalation. (1) gives escalation that saturates:

The Escalation archetype would be better if it distinguished explicit goals for A and B results. Then you could mathematically express the key feature of (2) that gives rise to arms races:

  • A’s goal is x% more bombs than B
  • B’s goal is y% more bombs than A

Both of these models are instances of a generic second-order linear model that encompasses all possible things a linear model can do:

Notice that the first-order and second-order loops are disentangled here, which makes it easy to see the “inner” first order loops (which often contribute damping) and the “outer” second order loop, which can give rise to oscillation (as above) or the growth in the escalation archetype. That loop is difficult to discern when it’s presented as a figure-8.

Of course, one could map these archetypes to other figure-8 structures, like:

How could you tell the difference? You probably can’t, unless you consider what the stocks and flows are in an operational implementation of the archetype.

The bottom line is that the causal loop diagram of an archetype or anything else doesn’t tell you enough to simulate the behavior of the system. You have to specify additional assumptions. If the system is nonlinear or stochastic, there might be more assumptions than I’ve shown above, and they might be important in new ways. The process of surfacing and testing those assumptions by building a stock-flow model is very revealing.

If you don’t build a model, you’re in the awkward position of intuiting behavior from structure that doesn’t uniquely specify any particular mode. In doing so, you might be way ahead of non-systems thinkers approaching the same problem with a laundry list. But your ability to discover errors, incorporate data and discover leverage is far greater if you can simulate.

The model: wikiArchetypes1b.mdl (runs in any version of Vensim)

Loopy

I just gave Loopy a try, after seeing Gene Bellinger’s post about it.

It’s cool for diagramming, and fun. There are some clever features, like drawing a circle to create a node (though I was too dumb to figure that out right away). Its shareability and remixing are certainly useful.

However, I think one must be very cautious about simulating causal loop diagrams directly. A causal loop diagram is fundamentally underspecified, which is why no method of automated conversion of CLDs to models has been successful.

In this tool, behavior is animated by initially perturbing the system (e.g, increase the number of rabbits in a predator-prey system). Then you can follow the story around a loop via animated arrow polarity changes – more rabbits causes more foxes, more foxes causes less rabbits. This is essentially the storytelling method of determining loop polarity, which I’ve used many times to good effect.

However, as soon as the system has multiple loops, you’re in trouble. Link polarity tells you the direction of change, but not the gain or nonlinearity. So, when multiple loops interact, there’s no way to determine which is dominant. Also, in a real system it matters which nodes are stocks; it’s not sufficient to assume that there must be at least one integration somewhere around a loop.

You can test this for yourself by starting with the predator-prey example on the home page. The initial model is a discrete oscillator (more rabbits -> more foxes -> fewer rabbits). But the real system is nonlinear, with oscillation and other possible behaviors, depending on parameters. In Loopy, if you start adding explicit births and deaths, which should get you closer to the real system, simulations quickly result in a sea of arrows in conflicting directions, with no way to know which tendency wins. So, the loop polarity simulation could be somewhere between incomprehensible and dead wrong.

Similarly, if you consider an SIR infection model, there are three loops of interest: spread of infection by contact, saturation from running out of susceptibles, and recovery of infected people. Depending on the loop gains, it can exhibit different behaviors. If recovery is stronger than spread, the infection dies out. If spread is initially stronger than recovery, the infection shifts from exponential growth to goal seeking behavior as dominance shifts nonlinearly from the spread loop to the saturation loop.

I think it would be better if the tool restricted itself to telling the story of one loop at a time, without making the leap to system simulations that are bound to be incorrect in many multiloop cases. With that simplification, I’d consider this a useful item in the toolkit. As is, I think it could be used judiciously for explanations, but for conceptualization it seems likely to prove dangerous.

My mind goes back to Barry Richmond’s approach to systems here. Causal loop diagrams promote thinking about feedback, but they aren’t very good at providing an operational description of how things work. When you’re trying to figure out something that you don’t understand a priori, you need the bottom-up approach to synthesize the parts you understand into the whole you’re grasping for, so you can test whether your understanding of processes explains observed behavior. That requires stocks and flows, explicit goals and actual states, and all the other things system dynamics is about. If we could get to that as elegantly as Loopy gets to CLDs, that would be something.

Aging is unnatural

Larry Yeager and I submitted a paper to the SD conference, proposing dynamic cohorts as a new way to model aging populations, vehicle fleets, and other quantities. Cohorts aren’t new*, of course, but Ventity makes it practical to allocate them on demand, so you don’t waste computation and attention on a lot of inactive zeroes.

The traditional alternative has been aging chains. Setting aside technical issues like dispersion, I think there’s a basic conceptual problem with aging chains: they aren’t a natural, intuitive operational representation of what’s happening in a system. Here’s why.

Consider a model of an individual. You’d probably model age like this:

Here, age is a state of the individual that increases with aging. Simple. Equivalently, you could calculate it from the individual’s birth date:

Ideally, a model of a population would preserve the simplicity of the model of the individual. But that’s not what the aging chain does:

This says that, as individuals age, they flow from one stock to another. But there’s no equivalent physical process for that. People don’t flow anywhere on their birthday. Age is continuous, but the separate stocks here represent an arbitrary discretization of age.

Even worse, if there’s mortality, the transition time from age x to age x+1 (the taus on the diagram above) is not precisely one year.

You can contrast this with most categorical attributes of an individual or population:

When cars change (geographic) state, the flow represents an actual, physical movement across a boundary, which seems a lot more intuitive.

As we’ll show in the forthcoming paper, dynamic cohorts provide a more natural link between models of individuals and groups, and make it easy to see the lifecycle of a set of related entities. Here are the population sizes of annual cohorts for Japan:

I’ll link the paper here when it’s available.


* This was one of the applications we proposed in the original Ventity white paper, and others have arrived at the same idea, minus the dynamic allocation of the cohorts. Demographers have been doing it this way for ages, though usually in statistical approaches with no visual representation of the system.